The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition by Tigar, Michael E. & Levy, Madeline R.
THE GRAND JURY
AS THE
NEW INQUISITION
This article was the basis for Mr.
Tigar's luncheon address September
21, 1971 during the 36th Annual
Meeting of the State Bar of Michigan.
By Michael Tigar
and
Madeline R. Levy
THIS ARTICLE stems from our concern
with the democratic value of the Bill
of Rights. One theme of our writing
and work has been that the constitu-
tional guarantees of political freedom
have been undermined for two reasons:
First, the constitutionalization of pri-
vate property has led to the creation of
aggregations of power not subject to
control by those who are victims of
power's exercise. The Lockean theory
of private property, and its labor theory
of value, rests in part upon the view
that "property" is a relation between
a person and a thing.
But when the "things" are means of
production, housing and places of public
accommodation, ownership carries with it
power over people's lives. This power,
endemic to capitalist social relations,
undermines constitutional guarantees of
freedom. This point is beyond the reach
of this paper.'
Second, the system of "checks and
balances" is designed to assure that
abuses of power and of constitutional
principle are subject to constant correc-
tion. The grand jury is an institution
1. See, however, Tigar, "Socialist Law
and Legal Institutions," in Law Against
the People (Random House, 1971).
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which by design is counterposed to the
power of the Executive and the Judiciary
for the protection of citizens.
In fact, as we shall argue, it fails
to perform this function. Such is the
fate of many institutional guarantees of
liberty in the Constitution and Bill of
Rights, in the face of the new repression.
To borrow from de Jouvenel: In their
haste to reach a certain result, the au-
thors of repression forget or ignore deep-
seated values about who is to decide
and bow decisions are to be reached.
We believe that this systematic over-
throw of democratic guarantees cannot
be ended within the present system of
social relations.
GRAND JURY IMAGE
Public impressions of the grand jury
are myriad: "Mr. District Attorney" on
TV; some knowledge of racism in grand
and trial jury selection in the South;
garbled newspaper versions of Sister
Jogues Egan's travail.
The grand jury's low visibility, at
least until recently, is explainable. Many
states have no provision for a grand
jury at all. Some, like California, keep
the grand jury but use it principally as
a body of middle and upper-class citi-
zens-selected by the judges in each
county-who look into and write re-
ports about county government. In
California, fewer than ten percent of
felony cases begin with a grand jury
indictment.
The grand jury performs its historic
function, sifting evidence to determine
whether a crime has been committed,
in very few cases. Most district at-
torneys send only controversial cases to
the grand jury-for example, cases in-
volving alleged police misconduct, in
which the D.A. can present a less-than-
credible case for indictment; the grand
jury can return "no bill" (fail to indict)
and the decision has an air of impar-
tiality nonetheless.
As any lawyer who frequents the
criminal courts knows, the D.A. can get
an indictment almost at will, and the
grand jury's institutional disinterest can
be used to insulate him from critcism
for indicting or failing to indict.
In England, the country of its birth,
the grand jury was abolished in 1933,
save for very few cases. Reflecting the
disuse and near-abandonment of the
grand jury as an institution, teachers
of criminal procedure in our law schools
have paid little attention to it. The
leading criminal procedure case book,
Paulsen and Kadish, barely mentions
the grand jury and constitutional law
case books treat the subject only with
reference to, racial discrimination.
Yet in the federal courts, the grand
jury has remained as, a sometimes som-
nolent but always potentially powerful
investigative and law enforcement de-
vice. In our history, the questions have
been: "Investigation of what?" and
"Whose law?"
The fifth amendment requires that all
federal felony prosecutions begin by
grand jury indictment. And the 1968
and 19,70 crime bills give the grand
jury a potentially great role in federal
criminal procedure.
These remarks concentrate on the
federal grand jury and on its expanding
use in suppressing dissent. By way of
prologue, we look first at the origin and
operation of the grand jury in the fed-
eral system, and second at the recent
history of repressive moves by govern-
ment against dissent. What we say is
relevant also to those states, particularly
New York, where the grand jury in
the hands of an ambitious district at-
torney can wreak as much anguish as
a federal grand jury on the loose under
the direction of one of Attorney Gen-
eral Mitchell's "strike forces."
SOME HISTORY OF GRAND JURIES
The grand jury emerged in the
twelfth century as an instrument of
royal power. The Assize of Clarendon
in 1166 provided that in each com-
munity a body of the "most lawful
men" should have the power and duty
to make "inquiry . . . whether in their
hundred or vill there be any man who
is accused or believed to be a robber,
murdered, thief or receiver of robbers,
murderers or thieves since the King's
accession.
This body would make its accusation
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of crime and the accused would then
be put on "trial," to consist of some
ordeal prescribed by law. The Assize
dictated:
And he who shall be found
accused or believed to be a robber,
murderer, thief, or a receiver of
such since the King's accession shall
be taken and put to the ordeal of
water and made to swear that he
was no robber, murderer, thief, or
receiver of such up to the value of
five shillings, so far as he knows,
since the King's accession. 2
The creation of the grand jury was
the parallel in the field of criminal jus-
tice to the Domesday Book, William the
Conqueror's record of the population,
land and chattel holdings of every
manor. Domesday Book, and the inquisi-
tions which collected information for it,
provided the Crown with information
necessary to exercise taxing jurisdiction
over the whole realm.
The grand jury brought the royal
presence into the lucrative field of the
criminal law, where fines and forfeitures
would provide new additions to the
royal treasury. Persons accused under
the Assize of Clarendon were to be
brought before the King's officers or
justice, not before a manorial court.
This procedure after "presentment" of
an accused felon by an indicting jury
underwent rapid change in the next
century. Often the presenting jury would
simply be asked whether the accused
was guilty. More usually, the indicting
jury and two or three other similar
bodies from other communities would
sit together as a trial jury.
In the mid-13th century, the formal
2. It apparently did not help much if one
came through the ordeal in the proper
way, for the Assize also provided: "The
Lord King also wishes that those who
make their law and clear themselves
shall nevertheless, forswear the King's
land if they are of bad renown and
publicly and evilly reputed by the testi-
mony of many lawful men, and cross
the sea within eight days unless detained
by the weather, and with the first fa-
vourable wind they shall cross the sea
and never come back to England save
by the King's permission, and shall be
outlawed, and if they come back shall
be captured as outlaws."
separation of the indicting or "grand"
jury and the trial or "petit" jury, oc-
curred. From the many grand jurors
from many communities there would be
picked a trial jury of twelve.
Of course, the trial jury might include
some members of the same grand jury
which returned the indictment-hardly
fair to the accused, one might say.
But "if the indictors be not there it is
not good for the King," as one judge put
it in 1341. In 1352, however, the separa-
tion became complete and grand jurors
could thereafter be challenged off a petit
jury.
The origins of the grand jury are
thus in the royal search for prerogative.
Of course, the possibility of initiation of
criminal proceedings by other means still
remained after the Assize of Clarendon,
and the precise role of the grand jury
was not settled until the 17th century,
a period in which struggle and tumult
led to great change in the English legal
system. From this period, the American
Bill of Rights derives most of its pro-
visions on criminal procedure.
The practice in the Court of Star
Chamber of proceeding by "information"
-a sworn statement by a public official
or private person that the defendant had
committed a crime-became a focus of
opposition. By the end of the century,
it was settled that an informant could be
used only in cases of misdemeanor and
that felonies could be tried only upon
indictment of a grand jury.
"BULWARK OF LIBERTY"
The grand jury-like the petit jury-
was regarded as a "bulwark of liberty,"
a body which might interpose indepen-
dent judgment between the State and
the individual. This function could not
credibly be termed "historic," given the
motive behind the Assize of Clarendon,
but in the rewriting of history which
characterized the 17th century legal
reform, it seemed helpful to say that
the grand jury should play a certain
role because it had "always" done so.
In this form the ideology of the grand
jury came to this country in the Fifth
Amendment guarantee that "no person
shall be held to answer for a capital or
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otherwise infamous crime except upon
presentment or indictment of a grand
jury," a provision which found echo in
most state constitutions and statutes.
The grand jury's role in the federal
courts was not intended to create much
of a stir in criminal justice. The 1790
Crimes Act defined few offenses and
early federal criminal trials were mostly
for piracy, smuggling and offenses (or
sometimes insurgencies), against the
revenue.
Hopes that the grand jury could func-
tion independent of the Executive were
proven false by 1798, when the Adams
government began its war on dissidents.
A word on how a grand jury works will
show how the abuses under Adams
evolved: A grand jury modernly consists
of twenty-three persons, usually untrained
in the law, with the power to issue sub-
poenas under seal of the court. While
the grand jurors may question witnesses,
and do to some extent, this function is
usually usurped by a United States At-
torney or other government lawyer. This
lawyer also advises the jurors on the law
and draws up indictments to be voted
upon.
The grand jury meets in secret and
its proceedings may not be disclosed by
jurors or government counsel. When a
grand jury is sworn, it receives general
instructions as to its duties from a United
States district judge. If a grand jury is
specially summoned to consider some
particular event, it may receive a more
precise "charge."
Under the Alien and Sedition Acts
of Adams' administration, the control of
the grand jury which inheres in its struc-
ture was effectively exercised. Charged
in a rambling, tendentious and inac-
curate manner by the likes of Chief
Justice Chase,8 and acting under the
direction of Adams-appointed piosecu-
tors, grand juries readily indicted Re-
publicans for seditious activity.
This ability of a party in power
to turn the criminal process to its politi-
3. Until after the Civil War, Supreme
Court Justices presided over trials "on
circuit," sitting in the circuit courts,
equivalent to our Federal district courts
of today.
cal ends has been the subject of careful
study by later governments. The in-
creasing professionalization of the federal
prosecutorial establishment, the expan-
sion of federal criminal jurisdiction, and
the devising of new means to compel
testimony gave the grand jury a fearsome
potential power. The 1968 and 1970
crime bills, ostensibly directed at organ-
ized crime, seek to exploit this potential.
SOME RECENT REPRESSION
The principle devices of the McCar-
thyite (Joe, not Gene) terror were the
extravagant accusation, the publicity-
studded investigation, and the threat
of contempt for refusal to answer ques-
tions. These tactics were pursued in
the years after World War II as a
kind of domestic political prop to an
international cold war.
The notoriety which surrounded the
targets of accusation and the recipients
of subpoena was calculated to chill
dissent: The public papers of McCarthy,
the Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities, and the various state carbon
copies of these, attest that this was so.
The threat of a jail term for failure to
appear and answer questions was, as the
early experience of the Hollywood Ten
and the later cases of Carl Braden and
Frank Wilkinson show, a not inconsider-
able adjunct to the power of subpoena.
But the power of McCarthyism
waned (though its spores have found
fertile ground and trace deep roots yet).
The discredit of McCarthy himself was
no doubt a factor. Contempt citations,
too, proved a cumbersome and uncer-
tain threat. First, the committee and
the house concerned had to certify the
contempt. Then, a grand jury had to
indict and a trial jury convict.4
The Supreme Court began, too, to
whittle away at the compulsory process
available to congressional committees,
4. Although contempt of Congress was only
a misdemeanor, the provisions of 2
U.S.C. §§ 192 et seq. (and predecessor
statutes) provided since the 1860's that
a grand jury indictment is necessary.
Of course, each house of the Congress
retains the power to punish contempt
summarily by summoning the offender
to the bar of the house.
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to redefine the contempt power nar-
rowly and to provide some procedural
decencies for witnesses.
The availability of the privilege
against self-incrimination was upheld
in the Emspak and Quinn cases, the
Watkins case placed restrictions on the
scope of the committee inquiry; pro-
cedural guarantees in contempt cases
were strengthened in Russell and Seeger;
the first amendment was upheld in
Sweezy and Gibson. Even the affirm-
ances by a closely-divided Court in
Barenblatt, Braden and Wilkinson sig-
nalled that the inquisitors' most extrava-
gant claims would not likely be sus-
tained.
With the growing strength of the
youth and peace movements in the early
1960's, the committees lost the power
to inspire fear. The HCUA efforts to
investigate the SDS and the Youth In-
ternational Party were pathetic and
largely unproductive; the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee's attempted in-
quiries of German SDS leader Karl
Dietrich-Wolff were rather a joke.
THE CONSPIRACY PROSECUTION
In 1968, the government received a
weapon, the conspiracy prosecution,
used earlier against other movements
for social change. Such prosecutions
sought to indict the leaders of a move-
ment and eventually jail them while
burdening the defense with staggering
costs, scaring away potential supporters
and imposing a regime of silence on the
left. The Spock case, directed at militant
antiwar dissent, followed the pattern
until the conviction was reversed in
1969.
The Chicago Eight conspiracy case
illustrates the point more vividly: A
grand jury was convened, charged in
highly inflammatory terms by Judge
Campbell, dominated first by Mayor
Daley's own Tom Foran and then, after
Nixon's inauguration, by Foran and a
Jerris Leonard emissary, and subjected to
a highly biased version of Chicago,
August 1968. But the trial, though it
cost the defense enormous sums and
took many fine movement workers out
of action for the duration, didn't scare
many people.
The Seattle Eight conspiracy trial,
directed at a local movement rather
than a national event, saw the govern-
ment unable to keep its case afloat past
the 11th trial day.
Clearly, the justice Department under
Mitchell needed new weapons which
would more certainly silence irrespon-
sible dissent and put movement leaders
in jail. Spiro Agnew's attacks were just
the thing for P.T.A. Sunday suppers but
they didn't frighten enough hard-core
dissenters.
In 1969 and 1970, the Justice Depart-
ment gave serious study to this problem.
The Supreme Court in January 1970 lent
renewed urgency to it by holding that
Selective Service local boards could not
be vehicles to punish dissent, rejecting
Attorney General Mitchell's anguished
plea that local boards had to have such
power because the criminal process and
its safeguards were too expensive and
uncertain.
In the Department, the Internal Se-
curity Division received new attention.
Long a haven for lawyers of little talent
and less imagination, the Division was
given a new chief, Robert Mardian, a
healthy budget addition and a new breed
of lawyer. Internal Security strike forces
began to appear in major investigations
of radical activity.
These strike forces, led by special as-
sistant attorneys general empowered by
law to seek the summoning of, and con-
duct proceedings before, federal grand
juries anywhere in the nation, moved in-
to Vermont, New York, Seattle, Los An-
geles, Detroit, San Francisco, Tucson,
Harrisburg, Brooklyn and numerous other
jurisdictions.
TYPICAL PATTERN
The typical pattern began to appear:
FBI agents would visit a number of acti-
vists, asking probing questions and im-
plying or saying that a grand jury sub-
poena would soon follow if there were
no ready answers. A grand jury would
be convened under authority of the 1970
Crime bill, which permits a grand jury
inquiry into organized crime, sedition or
riot-connected offenses, to sit for three
years. Then the subpoenas would issue.
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Consider the case of a grand jury in
Tucson, convened under the direction of
Guy Goodwin, the best-known of the
anti-left strike force lawyers. The subject
of investigation was assertedly a plot to
transport explosives in interstate com-
merce.
Because of the conspiracy law, that
medieval creature in modern dress, per-
mits a prosecution to be brought any-
where an "overt act" was committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy, Tucson
was chosen as the site for the grand
jury though almost all the witnesses were
to be summoned from Los Angeles, five
hundred miles away.
The grand jury promptly put out a
number of subpoenas and one material
witness warrant for Los Angeles move-
ment leaders. One center of the alleged
plot was, so the government believed, a
man named Robert Gottlieb. Witnesses
were asked, "Do vou know Robert Gott-
lieb?" and then, "Relate every conversa-
tion you had with Gottlieb in 1970."
The sweep of the inquiry could not have
been broader. The Justice Department
lawyers, with Goodwin at the lead, want-
ed to know the structure, organization,
membership and operation of an entire
grouping of movement activists in Ven-
ice, California. Prying into associations,
beliefs, speeches and conversations clear-
ly protected by affirmative constitutional
guarantees, the inquisitors gave notice
that government was marshaling its force
to shatter the political and personal pri-
vacy of those who were, or knew, acti-
vists in seeking social change.
At the drama's end, five young people
who had resisted the imprecations to
testify were in jail for indefinite terms,
and a quiet and watchful bush had re-
placed politics as usual in West Los An-
geles.
The drama was replayed elsewhere: A
New York Times reporter may yet go to
jail in San Francisco for refusal by si-
lence to shatter the political privacy of
his sources; the F.B.I. defrauded a dis-
trict judge and secured Leslie Bacon's
removal to Seattle and her incarceration
there; and there have been a dozen
more such instances across the nation.
It was remarkably like the good old
congressional witch-hunt, but with the
new and scarifying power of summary
contempt: A witness before a grand jury
who refuses to testify when ordered to
do so may be committed to jail sum-
marily for up to three years, or until she
or he answers the questions posed.
JAILING IMMEDIATE
The jailing is not a "next year" thing,
to happen after lengthy appeals. It may
be and often is imposed on the spot,
within minutes after the refusal. The
recalcitrant witness is taken before a
United States district judge and again
ordered to answer. Upon refusal, incar-
ceration begins immediately.
Let us examine this new weapon
against dissent in more detail, by not-
ing some aspects of trial by grand jury:
First, there is trial in secret, and by
inquiry. The grand jury sits in secret, a
practice begun to protect the innocent.
But the modern-dress version makes
the secrecy strikingly reminiscent of the
oath ex officio procedure which for a
time threatened to engulf and still
the first stirrings of the adversary sys-
tem, the presumption of innocence and
the right of public trial.
The evils which were disowned in the
creation of the right to a fair trial are
in fact quite at home in the grand jury
room: There is no right to notice of the
scope and nature of crimes being in-
vestigated; there is no confrontation of
the witnesses 5 who have led the trail
of the investigation to the witness's door-
step; and collaterally, there is no possi-
bility, much less a right, to cross-exam-
ine those witnesses.
Second, there! is the ordeal of exam-
ination without counsel, which even the
5. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (10) (a) provides
for suppression of illegally obtained
wiretap evidence ". . . in any trial,
hearing, or any proceeding in or before
any . . . authority of the United States
.The issue of whether or not
this section is applicable to grand jury
witnesses will be before the United
States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Egan,
cert. pending, (No. 71-263), Gelbard
and Parnas v. U.S., cert. pending, (No.
71-110), and U.S. v. Evans, cert. pend-
ing, (No. 71-256). See discussion below.
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Congressional committees never sought
to impose. In the grand jury room, coun-
sel is not permitted. True, the witness
may ask the government lawyer to be
excused and go out to the anteroom to
consult counsel, but the atmosphere is
heavily weighted in favor of the govern-
ment. There is no judge or other sup-
posedly impartial official present-only
the grand jurors and government coun-
sel.
Third, there is trial by the ordeal of
distance. A federal conspiracy prosecu-
tion may be brought, as noted before, in
any judicial district in which the overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy was
committed. However, if the prosecutor's
venue choice is too disadvantageous to
the defense, the court can order a
change of venue "for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and in the interest
of justice."
There is no such corrective available
for a venue choice in the site of a grand
jury investigation. So in Tucson, the wit-
nesses from Los Angeles were required
to bring their counsel with them and to
face their summary contempt hearings
and jail terms at a great distance from
home. At one time, the Tucson wit-
nesses were serving sentences in rural
Arizona jails scattered all over the state.
LIMITS ON BAIL AND APPEAL
Fourth, there are limitations on the
right to bail and to appeal. A defendant
charged with crime, even a serious of-
fense, can usually-in the federal courts
-secure prompt release on bail pending
trial. A grand jury witness found sum-
marily in contempt for refusal to answer
can expect serious and often insurmount-
able difficulty in obtaining release pend-
ing appellate review.
And the review available, under the
1970 crime bill, is truncated, providing
in many cases no opportunity even to
have the record of proceedings below
transmitted to the appellate court.
Fifth, the new grand jury dispenses
with the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. By the consistent course of federal
decision, a witness may decline to pro-
vide any information which may form a
link in a chain of evidence incriminatory
to him or her.
When government casts wide its con-
spiracy net, and the inquisition begins
into friendships and associations, almost
any question is potentially productive of
incriminatory testimony. To undermine
the privilege against self-incrimination,
the 1970 crime bill greatly expands the
scope of the so-called "immunity" pro-
vision of the United States Code.
Immunity laws have been recognized
in American law since the late 19th cen-
tury. In their "old form," they provide
that a witness could be granted immu-
nity from prosecution about all subjects
of her or his testimony. Thus, even if
the testimony were incriminatory, the
witness could not be prosecuted and
thus has, in theory, no need for a priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.
Immunity may thus be used when A
has information that will incriminate not
only her or him, but also B, whom the
authorities really want to prosecute.
Some deeper objections to this technique
are discussed below.
The 1970 crime bill, however, pro-
vides not for complete immunity, but
for a partial or "use" immunity. If A
incriminates herself or himself, the gov-
ernment may not use the incriminatory
testimony itself at a later trial of A, but
there is no provision that, having dis-
covered the misdeed the government
may not seek to prosecute it by gather-
ing other evidence.
This undermining of the privilege
against self-incrimination has been held
unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals
for the 7th Circuit and by U.S. District
Judge Constance Baker Motley of New
York.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Let us consider this problem in the
broader context of a sixth objection: The
grand jury inquisition destroys associa-
tional freedom by an assault upon polit-
ical privacy.
To begin, the grand jury's organ
grinder, the government lawyer, has ac-
cess to wiretap and other electronic sur-
veillance material which can be used as
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a basis for questioning and intimidating
witnesses.'
This is not the occasion to dwell upon
the wholesale grant of indiscriminate
wiretap authority in the 1968 crime bill,
nor upon the President's announced in-
tention to exceed even the powers grant-
ed in the act when "subversives" are to
be tapped. These issues are in the Su-
preme Court this term. The technology
of privacy-invasion, and the public sense
of its unbridled use, makes the grand
jury on the loose doubly chilling.
Another aspect of privacy-invasion
arises from indiscriminate poking and
prying into associational freedom. In an
active political organization, meetings,
friendships, discussions and interchange
of ideas are the means by which busi-
ness is done.
Assume that one member is subpoe-
naed to testify. That member can in-
voke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as to his or her own activities, but
not with respect to the activities, words
or beliefs of others. To the real worry
that in a student radical organization
there is a paid FBI informer, is added
the certainty that any member may,
against his or her will, be made an in-
former in the secrecy of the grand jury
room.
Seventh, the grand jury only pretext-
ually inquires into a specific crime or
crimes. More often it is convened to
surveil a group or groups whom the
Attorney General suspects, seeking some
pretext for making a formal charge. Of-
ten, the indictments that do result are
for offenses peripheral to the purported
purpose of the grand jury, or are so
ludicrously unsupported as to be post
hoc apologies for having begun the in-
vestigation in the first place.
The grand jury's work is not, under
Mitchell, to make charges to be tried,
openly and fairly. The grand jury is de-
signed to do what witch-hunting con-
gressional committees were designed to
do: Probe, expose, and punish the exer-
cise of political freedom by its imme-
6. This issue is in the Supreme Court this
term in Egan, Evans, and Gelbard-Par-
nas, cited above.
diate targets and chill dissent among all
but the hardiest of the onlookers.
NEW DIMENSION
Eighth, the grand jury has taken on
a new dimension, uncontemplated by
its creators and in defiance of its tradi-
tional role: It has become an evidence-
gathering body once an indictment has
been returned. Grand juries have con-
tinued in session long after voting in-
dictments, in an attempt to, give govern-
ment lawyers compulsory process for
obtaining criminal discovery explicitly
forbidden them by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Federal Rule 15 gives only defend-
ants the right to take depositions to
perpetuate testimony, and Federal Rule
16(c) severely limits the right of gov-
ernment lawyers to discovery. The re-
mainder of Federal Rule 16 limits the
defendant's right to discovery. Thus, the
use of the grand jury's power of sub-
poena is a clear evasion of the law.
The grand jury's power to affect pol-
itical freedom and to undermine consti-
tutional guarantees of fairness must be
curbed. In the legal arena, new tactics
against repressive use of grand juries
are being devised and tested. It is also
important to begin creating an informed
and concerned body of public opinion
which will consider the conduct of
grand juries as carefully and critically
as the conduct of Congressional witch-
hunts was studied in the Fifties-and
more so.
Many responsible law enforcement of-
ficials believe that the grand jury could
be abolished in favor of a universal
"preliminary hearing" method of insti-
stuting criminal charges. Such a system
would at least be public and would
permit participation by defense coun-
sel. Such hearings are conducted in
many criminal cases in the federal sys-
tem under the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 7 and are the alterna-
tive means to bringing criminal charges
in systems, such as California's, which
make indictment by grand jury optional.
(Continued on Page 717)
7. The D.C. Circuit cases of Blue v. U.S.
and Ross v. Sirica show that the pre-
liminary hearing can be meaningfui.
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